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A Distributional Analysis of Artisanal and Industrial Wage Levels and 
Expenditure in the Congolese Mining Sector 
BEN RADLEY 
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Abstract: Across low–income African countries, a process of foreign–controlled 
mining (re)industrialisation has been underway since the 1980s, gathering pace during 
the most recent decade. This paper aims to shed light on the long–term effects of this 
process on the strength and vibrancy of local mining economies. It does so through the 
analysis of original empirical data collected during 15 months of fieldwork at and 
around an industrial gold mine in South Kivu Province of the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, centred on how the entry of industrial mining into pre-existing artisanal 
mining economies has affected the total volume of mining wages earned, consumed 
and invested locally. It is demonstrated that, despite generating a 25–fold increase in 
productivity, mining reindustrialisation in South Kivu has not resulted in significant 
wage growth for most industrial workers, compared to the wages earned in artisanal 
mining. In addition, as a result of the displacement of artisanal mining to more 
marginal deposits (and the inability of new industrial jobs or wages to compensate), 
seven years on, the local availability of mining employment has halved and the volume 
of locally consumed and invested mining wages has decreased by around 40 per cent. 
Drawing on the findings, the wisdom of current World Bank and African government 
mining policy is questioned.    
Introduction 
Since the 1980s, the World Bank has loaned more than $1 billion to low–income country 
(LIC) governments across Africa to liberalise, privatise and deregulate the mining sector,1 
resulting in the en masse arrival of transnational corporations (TNCs) to lead a foreign–
controlled, large–scale mining (LSM) economy across the continent. The scale of the trend 
has been such that ‘for many low–income countries [today], particularly in sub–Saharan 
Africa, the mining sector represents one of the most crucial sources of investment and income 
in their economies’ (Farole & Winkler, 2014, p. 117). To make way for the construction of 
new industrial mines, Africans working in artisanal and small–scale mining (ASM) – 
estimated to number around 10 million people across the continent (World Bank, 2019) –. 
have been forcibly displaced from major deposits. In August 2017, for example, Ugandan 
military and police displaced around 70,000 artisanal gold miners (Ssekika, 2017, November 
3).      
Building on insights from the African mining and Global Value Chain (GVC) 
literatures, and drawing on Arthur Lewis’ theorisation on the relationship between 
productivity and wages in the global periphery, this paper aims to shed light on the long–term 
effects of TNC–led mining industrialisation on the strength and vibrancy of local economies 
in low–income African countries. It does so through the presentation and analysis of original 
empirical data collected at and around an industrial gold mine in South Kivu Province of the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), on the relative wage volumes earned in ASM and 
LSM, and how TNC arrival has affected the total volume of mining wages (ASM and LSM 
together) earned, consumed and invested locally. While the ‘resource curse’ literature drew 
general attention to the enclave–like nature of resource extraction (Auty, 1993; Sachs and 
Warner, 1995), more recent, Africa–focused scholarship has highlighted the continued 
difficulty of creating production linkages between capital–intensive mining projects and the 
surrounding economy in African LIC settings (Ferguson, 2005; Bond, 2007; Bush, 2008; 
Radley 2019a). Given this, the health of local economies in mineral–dependent African 
regions is likely to be most strongly affected by the long run impact of TNC arrival on locally 
earned wage volumes in mining. Enhanced understanding of this issue is particularly pressing 
in light of what Hilson (2019) has recently referred to as the continued ‘LSM bias’ of the 
World Bank and African governments, towards the continued marginalisation of ASM in 
favour of TNC–led industrial mining.                            
To the author’s knowledge, this is the first attempted analysis of its kind, centred on 
two interrelated questions. First, how does the size and strength of the local ASM sector 
evolve, following its initial displacement to make way for incoming TNCs? Second, to what 
extent does the greater productivity of TNC–led LSM drive higher wages for industrial 
mineworkers compared to ASM (and thus, compensate for any losses that might be incurred 
in ASM)? Following this line of questioning, and based on the case of the industrial 
Twangiza mine in South Kivu, owned by the Canadian corporation Banro, the main argument 
advanced by the article is that while Twangiza generated a 25–fold productivity increase 
compared to the surrounding ASM economy, this did not result in significant wage growth 
for most industrial workers, compared to the wages earned in ASM. Rather, the main 
beneficiary of the increased wage inequality induced by Banro’s arrival has been a narrow 
and generally externally–oriented managerial group. Meanwhile, as a result of ASM being 
pushed to more marginal and less productive deposits (and the inability of new industrial jobs 
or wages to compensate), seven years after the construction of Twangiza, the local 
availability of mining employment has halved and the volume of locally consumed and 
invested mining wages has decreased by around 40 per cent. Drawing on these findings, the 
wisdom of the continued ‘LSM bias’ in Africa is questioned.    
In the sections that follow, the second locates the paper’s empirical contribution, and 
the third discusses methodology. The fourth section provides a brief historical overview of 
mining in South Kivu, with a particular focus on the relationship between labour and wages, 
and calculates the scale of productivity growth induced by Banro’s recent arrival in the 
province. The effect of this productivity growth on wages is evaluated in section five, 
through a comparative distributional analysis of the respective wages earned by industrial 
mining labour and labour in the surrounding ASM economy. The sixth section assesses how 
the revival of LSM in South Kivu has impacted the total volume of mining wages (artisanal 
and industrial) consumed and invested at the local level, to determine the effect of this 
process on the strength of the local economy. The seventh section concludes by considering 
the implications of the findings.       
Mining Industrialisation and Wages: Problems of Scale and Directionality 
Problems of both scale and directionality are encountered when considering, based on the 
existing literature, the likely long–term effect of TNC–led mining industrialisation in African 
LICs on the total volume of locally available mining wages. Related to the first question 
guiding analysis – how the size and strength of the local ASM sector might evolve following 
its initial displacement – the intuitive answer is that the sector will shrink, and the local 
availability of mining labour will decrease, as a labour intensive form of production is 
replaced by one that is highly capital intensive. This is supported by case study research, 
which has drawn attention to the negative impact of African LSM on ASM and local 
livelihoods (Luning, 2008; Owusu–Korantang, 2008; Bush, 2009; Yankson and Gough, 
2019). However, this picture is complicated by additional literature on African mining which 
has noted that over a longer time period, ASM and LSM can and often do continue to exist in 
close proximity to one another, partly due to the propensity of artisanal miners to exploit 
deposits of little strategic value to LSM operators (Hilson, 2002; Nyame and Blocher, 2010; 
Geenen, 2011). In a case study from Ghana, for example, Hilson (2002, p. 149) documented 
that despite initial conflict, over time ‘both parties [have been] able to coexist in harmony 
within the same land plot’. Given this, the scale of change is less evident than might first be 
assumed, and even its directionality, if the long–term effect on ASM is minimal and 
industrial wages are high enough to compensate for any job losses incurred.        
This then leads into the second question, which presents similar ambiguity, on the 
extent to which the greater productivity of LSM leads to higher wages for industrial 
mineworkers. Theoretically, the neoclassical model of wages ‘suggests that wages are set 
according to the marginal productivity of workers so that differences in wages result from 
differences in productivity’ (Kerswell, 2013, p. 507). According to this theory, then, as the 
productivity of mining increases in the shift from ASM to LSM, so will local worker wages. 
Providing empirical support to this theory, a revisionist line of historical scholarship argues 
mining was an important driver of increased wages and economic diversification during the 
early stages of (capitalist) development in today’s industrialised countries, such as Spain, 
Sweden, Finland, the US and Australia (Blomstrom & Kokko, 2007; Wright & Czelusta, 
2007; Domenech, 2008; Calvo et al. 2019). Yet both neoclassical wage theory and the 
supportive empirical evidence emanate from the global North, where the literature has also 
emphasised the centrality of non–resource sector production linkages and other 
complementarities (such as technological innovation); factors noted earlier as generally 
absent in African LICs.    
Of more relevance to these countries, then, might be the Saint Lucian economist 
Arthur Lewis’ (1954) seminal open economy model of economic growth with unlimited 
supplies of labour, in which Lewis theorises the relationship between productivity and wages 
in the global periphery, as distinct from its historical evolution in today’s industrialised 
centres. Pursuing the question of why Caribbean commercial crops were so cheap despite 
their high productivity, Lewis argued that wages in this industry are set according to the 
productivity of what he called ‘subsistence sectors’ rather than in capitalist export sectors. As 
a result, he contended, the benefits of increasing productivity in capitalist export sectors 
accrue not to the workers, but ‘to the (Northern) importers of these exports by way of lower 
prices’ (Fischer, 2011, p. 521).           
Transposed to African LICs today, Lewis’ model suggests industrial mining wages 
will be set in the ‘subsistence sectors’ of the surrounding informal economy, not according to 
the productivity of the formal export sector. While there is a general dearth of studies on 
LSM wage levels in Africa, Lewis’ theorisation is nonetheless supported by recent evidence 
from critical GVC scholarship, which has highlighted the low wage levels earned by African 
workers in other export sectors, facilitated by the expansion of labour informality and 
subcontracting within these formal sector chains (Barrientos, 2014; Goger et al., 2014; 
Meagher, 2016, 2019; Alford et al., 2017). These findings run contrary to an implicit 
assumption underpinning the mainstream GVC literature, and more closely aligned to the 
neoclassical wage model, ‘that economic upgrading in GVCs will automatically translate into 
social upgrading through greater employment opportunities and higher wages’ (Taglioni & 
Winkler, 2014, p. 199, see also Selwyn, 2018). Given the global mining industry’s openly 
anti–union stance, lobbying governments for more 'flexibility' around labour (Marshall, 
2015), and the observed shift in the industry towards workforce casualisation (Haglund, 
2010), similar outcomes to those noted by the more critical GVC literature should be 
expected.          
While this tempers prospects that the greater productivity of African LSM will drive a 
significant increase in industrial worker wages compared to those earned in ASM, Meagher 
(2016, p. 493) has noted that although economic gains within GVCs have failed to benefit 
informal workers at the bottom of these chains, they have tended to benefit formal workers. 
This raises additional questions as to how far labour informality has spread in African LSM, 
and to what extent its formal workers have benefited from increased wages? Yet the absence 
of distributional data on LSM wage levels, together with the above–noted uncertainty over 
the long–term impact of LSM arrival on the size and vibrancy of the local ASM sector, 
render both the scale and directionality of change in the volume of locally available mining 
wages unclear, and in need of further empirical investigation. It is to this task that the 
remaining sections now turn.   
A Note on Methods 
Banro’s Twangiza mine provides an ideal case for this study, as it’s located in a peripheral 
region of one of the most income–poor African countries. The case is also typical of the 
privatised and deregulated sector installed across the continent following World Bank–
financed reform. Fieldwork for the study was undertaken between May 2016 and July 2017, 
consisting mainly of site visits to the Twangiza mine and the adjacent artisanal mine of 
Kadumwa, alongside extended stays in Luhwindja (the area in which the mines are located). 
Data was collected from a wide range of sources, including direct observation, corporate 
archives and documentation, a labour survey reaching 316 artisanal workers at Kadumwa and 
126 industrial workers at Twangiza, and conversations, interviews or oral histories with at 
least 287 artisanal and industrial mine workers and managers. A combination of convenience 
and snowball sampling was used to identify respondents and interviewees, with a focus on 
ensuring adequate representation from across the respective ASM and LSM labour 
hierarchies.    
To estimate productivity and the distribution of wages at the informal artisanal 
Kadumwa mine, extended, empirical fieldwork was undertaken, taking general inspiration 
from the pioneering work of Polly Hill (1963) in Ghana. To this end, 13 monthly production 
and financial logbooks were collected from four of Kadumwa’s artisanal shaft managers 
(who oversee the labour and production process) over a one–year period, representing just 
less than 10 percent of the 44 shaft managers working at the mine that year. The logbooks 
kept daily records of shaft production, and the distribution of in–kind or monetary payments 
to different groups of labour. Collecting the logbooks across twelve months controlled to 
some extent for climate–induced variation in productivity, as the wet season is typically less 
productive than the dry season due to the increased danger and difficulty of working under 
heavy rains. In addition, effort was made to control for fluctuations in productivity along the 
lifecycle of a shaft, by ensuring the sample contained a range of new, mature and ageing 
shafts. Typically, periods of lower productivity in artisanal gold mining occur at the 
beginning (when workers are looking for the auriferous rock) and towards the end (when the 
deposit is nearing exhaustion). 
Two further notes about the data must be added. First, at both Twangiza and 
Kadumwa, gross (or end) value rather than value–added is used, in light of the difficulty of 
determining the value of inputs to industrial mining. Second, the calculations contain an in–
built assumption of a stable workforce, although in reality there was a degree of churning at 
both sites, particularly at Kadumwa. The impact on productivity was likely minimal, 
however, as a departing artisanal worker – for example, to harvest his agricultural production 
– was usually replaced by a new one. Survey and logbook data were collated and interpreted 
using Microsoft Excel, and interview data was collated, coded and interpreted with the 
assistance of ATLAS.ti software. 
Mining, Labour and Productivity in South Kivu  
Unlike precolonial copper production in the DRC’s Katanga region, mining in South Kivu 
began in the early twentieth century. According to corporate archives, the first minerals 
extracted from the province were shipped to Belgium in 1924, through the Belgian–owned 
subsidiary Société minière des Grands Lacs (MGL) – Great Lakes Mining Company. 
Throughout the colonial period, Bami (customary rulers, singular ‘Mwami’) were relied upon 
to mobilise local labour across the province, in part due to the general indifference of the 
peasantry to wage labour, given their on–farm capacity to meet their subsistence needs and 
ensure their social reproduction (Bezy, 1957, p. 159–161). Many people in Luhwindja – the 
government collectivity where Banro’s Twangiza mine is located today – saw the work as 
undesirable, so the local Mwami resorted to sending those in conflict with him to work in the 
mines as punishment (Bisharhwa, 1982, p. 88).  
Yet from at least as early as the 1950s, a parallel network of informal artisanal mining 
began to emerge. Internal MGL correspondence shortly after Congolese Independence in 
1960 details an established network of illegal gold production and trade in South Kivu, in 
which ‘a fistful of audacious men, without scruples and of undefined nationality, are making 
fortunes’. At least as early as the 1980s, following a quadrupling of the Kivu population since 
the 1930s (World Bank, 1984, p. 145), industrial worker wages had fallen below revenue 
earned in the informal ASM sector. By this time, MGL had merged with other foreign 
subsidiaries into Société minière et industrielle du Kivu (SOMINKI) – Kivu Mining and 
Industrial Company (still under majority Belgian ownership), and SOMINKI’s 1980 annual 
report documented increasing worker desertion. The report noted the problem ‘to find its 
origin in the growing attraction of artisanal gold exploitation, which procures for those 
interested revenue and savings and the means to acquire…consumer goods available on the 
market’. The implication, supported by interviews with former SOMINKI workers (Bukavu 
and Kamituga, February to April 2017), is that worker wages were too low to save or 
purchase consumer goods. Corporate archives indicate that real wages continued to decline 
into the 1990s. SOMINKI eventually collapsed in 1997, shortly after the onset of the First 
Congo War, having failed to recover from the tin price crash of 1985, during which the 
international tin price more than halved (just before the crash, in 1984, tin contributed 74 per 
cent of SOMINKI’s revenue).      
With the withdrawal of Belgian–led industrial mining in the late 1990s, ASM firmly 
established itself as the most important off–farm source of employment in South Kivu. 
Available estimates for the total number of artisanal miners working in South Kivu and the 
neighbouring province of North Kivu today put the figure at between 200,000 and 350,000 
(Geenen & Radley, 2014, p. 59), with four out of five estimated to be mining gold (Weyns et 
al., 2016, p. 4). In South Kivu’s gold sector, Geenen (2014, p. 173–174) has estimated 
artisanal worker wages to be twice to several times higher than those available in agriculture 
or petty trade locally. 
Following the official end of the Congo Wars in 2002, Banro’s Twangiza gold project 
– managed by its DRC–based subsidiary Twangiza Mining – became the first industrial mine 
to reach the production phase, beginning commercial production in 2012. In 2010, to make 
way for the construction of Twangiza, artisanal miners were forcibly evicted from Mbwega, 
the largest artisanal mine in Luhwindja at the time. The land immediately surrounding the site 
was also enclosed, resulting in the forced displacement of around two–and–a–half thousand 
villagers to the nearby hilltop of Cinjira (Geenen & Honke, 2014). In response to Mbwega’s 
appropriation, hundreds of artisanal miners reoccupied Kadumwa and Lukunguri (Geenen & 
Radley, 2014, p. 62), two smaller sites located around two kilometres downhill from the 
Twangiza mine. Of the two, Kadumwa became by far the largest, employing around 800 
people in 2017. 
Calculating the respective productivity of Kadumwa and Twangiza provides a useful 
benchmark to assess the extent to which the greater productivity of the capital–intensive 
Twangiza mine is reflected in higher wages to its industrial workers. At Kadumwa, shaft 
manager logbooks indicated an estimated annual production of 59.7 kilograms. This equated 
to $2,341,772 of value created by Kadumwa in 2017, based on the average 2017 London 
Gold Fixing price of $40.42, and taking into consideration the gold’s 97 per cent purity (a 
percentage provided by local traders). Based on a shaft census and observation on–site, a 
total of 762 workers and managers was estimated at the site that same year. By dividing the 
annual value by the estimated units of labour, it can be estimated that in 2017 Kadumwa’s 
productivity (the value created, or output, per unit of labour) was $3,073, or around eight 
dollars per day.  
At Twangiza, the year 2013 is used, as this was the most recent year for which 
comprehensive data was collected, drawn primarily from Twangiza Mining’s 2013 financial 
accounts. Triangulating data across the Congolese Ministry of Mines, Twangiza Mining’s 
financial accounts, and Banro’s consolidated financial statements, in 2013 the Twangiza mine 
produced 2,564.9 kilograms of gold, creating $114.7 million of value. Based on corporate 
documentation and correspondence with Twangiza Mining’s Senior Human Resources 
Officer, that same year, there were 1,366 employees at the mine (either employed directly by 
Twangiza Mining or working through subcontracted firms). Based on this production and 
employment data, it can be estimated that in 2013 the labour productivity at Banro’s 
Twangiza mine was $83,983.  
Adjusting to the average 2017 gold price to facilitate comparison, Twangiza’s labour 
productivity can be estimated at $75,892 (or $208 per day) compared to the $3,073 (eight 
dollars per day) of Kadumwa. This represents a dramatic 25–fold productivity increase in 
Luhwindja’s mining economy. Yet despite the significantly greater productivity of Banro’s 
Twangiza mine compared to the surrounding ASM economy, local worker wages at 
Twangiza have been broadly equivalent to those earned at Kadumwa. 
 
The Informal Logics of Formal Sector Wage Setting 
To determine wages earned at the artisanal Kadumwa mine, labour was divided into three 
main groups, based on direct observation at the mine: site workers (composed of water 
carriers, ore carriers and ore washers), shaft workers and shaft managers.2 Site workers stay 
above ground, while shaft workers descend underground to extract the ore. Shaft managers 
invest the finances required to construct and maintain the shaft, mobilise and organise labour 
in production, and manage the distribution of payment to workers. Consequently, shaft 
managers earn profits, while worker payments effectively function as wages.   
Beginning with site workers, water carriers earned 250 Congolese Francs (or $0.2) 
per 20–litre can of water carried, with each worker carrying between four and six cans a day. 
Taking five cans as the average daily labour performed by a water carrier, a water carrier’s 
daily wage was estimated as one dollar. Ore carriers earned 500FC ($0.4) for each bag of ore 
carried, with each worker carrying between five to six bags a day. Taking five bags as the 
average daily labour performed by an ore carrier, an ore carrier’s daily wage was estimated as 
two dollars. Interviews and conversations with ore washers reported daily wages of between 
one to five thousand Congolese Francs (around one to four dollars) a day per worker. From 
this, an average daily wage of $2.5 was taken. Subtracting for informal taxes paid to local 
government authorities, and based on Kadumwa’s six–day working week, net monthly wages 
were estimated as $27 for a water carrier, $50.4 for an ore carrier and $57.6 for an ore 
washer. 
All shaft workers were paid by shaft managers, each according to different logics but 
with remuneration always dependent, to greater or lesser degrees, upon production. To 
determine shaft worker wages, shaft manager production and financial logbooks were used. 
The logbooks recorded the monetary and in–kind payments made by managers to shaft 
workers. All taxes were paid by shaft managers, with none incurred by the shaft workers 
themselves. Combining the data across the 13 monthly logbooks generated an estimated 
average monthly wage of $163 per worker (see Appendix Table A).  
To estimate shaft manager profits, worker wages, rent and taxes were subtracted from 
the total value created by their shafts (all of which were recorded in their logbooks). This 
leads to estimated average shaft manager monthly profits of $1,379 (see Appendix Table B). 
To this must be added the profits they make from engaging in gold trade, with many buying 
gold from their own and other workers to sell directly to the traders in Bukavu, the nearby 
provincial capital of South Kivu, around a five–hour bus journey from Luhwindja. Drawing 
on the buying and selling prices recorded in the logbooks, shaft manager trading activity 
increased their average monthly profits by $295, from $1,379 to $1,674 per month. 
Compiling worker and manager data, Table 1 presents an overview of wage and profit 
distribution at Kadumwa in 2017.   
Table 1. Kadumwa wage/profit distribution, 2017 

























Water Carriers 30 27 324 9,720 0.5 
Ore Carriers 80 51 605 48,384 2.3 
Ore Washers 80 58 691 55,296 2.7 
Shaft Workers 528 163 1,956 1,032,768 50 
SUBTOTAL WORKERS 718 – – 1,146,168 55.5 
Shaft Managers 44 1,674 20,088 883,872 42.8 
Taxes – – – 34,080 1.7 
TOTAL 762 – – 2,064,120 100 
Sources: Author estimates based on shaft census, conversations, interviews, a labour survey and shaft manager 
logbooks. 
 
Supporting the earlier findings of Geenen (2014, pp. 173–174), most wages, with the 
exception of those earned by water carriers, compared favourably to agriculture, which was 
remunerated locally at a daily rate of around one dollar per worker. Monthly shaft workers’ 
wages also compared favourably with more skilled forms of local labour, such as teaching, 
with local primary and secondary school teachers earning between $30 and $50 per month. 
Shaft manager monthly profits propelled them into Luhwindja’s economic elite. 
To determine wages earned at the industrial Twangiza mine, labour was once again 
divided into three categories, based on direct observation at the site: hired labour, 
subcontractor workers, and Twangiza Mining employees. Hired labour are informal day 
labourers working for local firms. Subcontractor workers work for firms subcontracted by 
Twangiza Mining to provide a range of goods, services and activities to the mine, such as 
security and catering. As with hired labour, many subcontractor workers were informal, 
working with no contract and limited benefits. Twangiza Mining employees are those directly 
contracted by the Canadian subsidiary.  
For Twangiza Mining, an internal corporate document from 2016 listed worker and 
manager wages by category, and the subsidiary’s financial accounts provided a detailed 
breakdown of the number of employees belonging to each of these categories. This 
documentation was triangulated through a labour survey and interviews and conversations 
with workers and managers. For hired labour and subcontracted employment, in the absence 
of company documentation (with a few exceptions), wage data was collected through a 
labour survey and worker and manager interviews and conversations. Workers and managers 
across all three categories (hired labour, subcontractors and Twangiza Mining) paid three 
different government taxes, with the rates paid across each tax indicated by Twangiza 
Mining’s payrolls and worker and manager payslips. Deducting for these different taxes, the 
net wages to the different worker and manager groups at Twangiza in 2017 are presented in 
Table 2 (including overtime and allowances).   
Based on this data, it can be seen that 822 of Twangiza’s 1,149 workers, or 72 per 
cent, earned monthly wages of $270 or less that were broadly comparable to shaft worker 
wages. The lowest paid hired labour workers – of which there were 169, or 15 per cent of all 
industrial workers – earned $110, significantly below average artisanal shaft worker wages. 
While skilled Twangiza Mining workers – representing 26 per cent of all workers at the mine 
– earned wages considerably higher than those earned by artisanal workers, none of the 
industrial workers earned more than the average monthly shaft manager profits of $1,674.    
Table 2. Twangiza wage distribution, 2017 



















Workers Hired Labour  323 154 1,851 597,970 3.6 
Subcontractor Workers 285 226 2,713 773,091 4.7 
Twangiza 
Mining 
Unskilled I 214 270 3,240 693,257 4.2 
II 24 360 4,325 103,789 0.6 
Skilled III 128 511 6,135 785,328 4.8 
IV 42 614 7,369 309,500 1.9 
V 133 930 11,165 1,484,978 9 
SUBTOTAL WORKERS 1,149 – – 4,747,914 28.9 
Congolese Managers 146 1,578 18,933 2,764,238 16.8 
Foreign Managers 71 6,605 79,265 5,627,816 34.2 
SUBTOTAL MANAGERS 217 – – 8,392,054 51 
Taxes – – – 3,307,272 20.1 
TOTAL  1,366 – – 16,447,240 100 
Notes: The employment data in Twangiza Mining’s financial accounts divides unskilled workers across categories I and II, 
and skilled workers across categories III, IV and V; Wage data includes overtime and allowances. On top of their base wage, 
workers and managers at Twangiza Mining receive lodging, transport, and child and spouse allowances, with managers also 
receiving a responsibility allowance. Overtime makes a significant difference to worker wages, often as much as doubling 
the base wage in the case of subcontractor workers.  
Sources: Twangiza Mining wage classification documentation; Twangiza Mining 2013 financial accounts; labour survey; 
conversations and interviews. 
 
In addition, comparing Twangiza Mining worker payroll data and worker payslips from 2012 
with the subsidiary’s 2016 wage structure indicates wage levels to have been stagnant for all 
groups across this five–year period. In 2010, Twangiza Mining also annulled its 3 per cent 
annual wage increase (a legal requirement according to Congolese labour law), and by 2017, 
it had yet to be reinstated (Interviews, Twangiza Mining union delegates, Twangiza, June and 
July 2017).3 Across this time period, from 2010 to 2017, data from the Congolese Central 
Bank indicates that the DRC’s annual inflation rate was 7.5 per cent. Over the last several 
years, then, the nominal value of Twangiza Mining worker wages has stagnated, while the 
real value has declined.   
The low and stagnant wages earned by the lower strata of workers at Twangiza can be 
ascribed, at least in part, to the downwards pressure exerted by the shift in the local labour 
supply from scarce to abundant. According to government data, Luhwindja’s population 
density increased from around 44 people per square kilometre at the beginning of the 
twentieth century to around 530 people per square kilometre in 2017 (or from 8,200 
inhabitants to 97,080). In the early twentieth century, as noted earlier, local people were 
generally resistant to working for Belgian mining companies, and the Mwami of Luhwindja 
had to forcibly recruit members of families with whom he was in conflict to work in the 
mines. By 2017, however, the situation had reversed. As one manager at the Luhwindja 
office of a labour hire firm reflected: There are days when ten people come to ask for work 
when we don’t have any…. We even receive text messages. It’s enough just to have heard 
there’s a job available and you’ll find even 100 people for the one job (Interview, Diphil 
manager, Luhwindja, 23 April 2017). 
A second contributory factor has been the relatively weak position of workers vis–à–
vis their managers. Between 2016 and 2017, around 40 per cent of Twangiza’s workforce had 
no form of contract, and labour at the mine was separated across 15 different firms. As 
Radley (2019b) has argued, this high degree of labour informality and fragmentation 
reproduced and further entrenched pre–existing spatial and social divisions between 
Twangiza’s workers, hindering their ability to self–organise and negotiate higher wages, 
despite the existence of a formally recognised union at the mine since 2014. This has been 
reflected in the near total absence of labour militancy at Twangiza since the mine was 
constructed in 2010.  
Productivity growth in South Kivu’s mining sector has, then, failed to lead to 
meaningful wage growth for most industrial mine workers, particularly those at the lowest 
levels of Twangiza’s labour hierarchy. Luhwindja’s abundant labour supply and barriers to 
collective action at Twangiza shed some explanatory light on why this has been the case. 
Exacerbating this situation, the total availability of mining labour (both ASM and LSM) in 
Luhwindja has nearly halved since Banro’s arrival, contributing to an overall decrease in the 
amount of mining wages consumed and invested locally. 
Artisanal Displacement and Uneven Wage Distribution 
The availability of mining labour in Luhwindja has declined significantly since the 
construction of Twangiza in 2010, driven by ASM’s failure to recover following the above–
mentioned forced closure of the artisanal Mbwega mine to make way for Twangiza’s 
construction. A labour census conducted at Mbwega prior to its appropriation estimated the 
presence of 500 shaft managers and 5,000 workers (Observatoire gouvernance et paix, 2008, 
p. 27). Discussions with an elected committee representing artisanal miners in Luhwindja, the 
Comité des creuseurs artisanaux de Luhwindja (CCALU) – the Artisanal Miners’ Committee 
of Luhwindja – suggested there were a further 500 miners working at other sites across the 
collectivity at the time, leading to an estimated total of 6,000 people directly employed in 
Luhwindja’s ASM sector prior to 2010. 
Three artisanal sites – Cinjira, Lumpumpu and Ntagare – were opened after the 
closure of Mbwega, but proved unproductive. As a result, many who had been relatively 
prosperous through their engagement in ASM fell into difficulty, as the following summary 
of an interview with a former Mbwega shaft manager demonstrates:   
His family owned maize and manioc fields near to the mine, along with five cows. When 
they were displaced to Cinjira they received $500 in compensation for their land. He 
used the money to construct two shafts at the new mine at Cinjira but both are now 
closed as they only led to a very small amount of gold. They sold all of their cows to 
generate some income, and today his two wives work as agricultural day labourers. He is 
looking for work (Interview, former Mbwega shaft manager, Cinjira, 7 April 2017). 
Author site visits, triangulated with data provided by CCALU and local government 
authorities, suggested there were an estimated 2,000 artisanal workers and managers across 
seven sites in Luhwindja in 2017, around one third the number prior to Banro’s arrival. 
Compounding this fall in locally available ASM labour, the low level of industrial 
employment and the uneven distribution of industrial wages has led to a rerouting of mining 
wages away from, rather than into, Luhwindja. With few exceptions, site and shaft workers at 
Kadumwa heralded from local herder–farmer families, and their wages were consumed and 
invested locally in Luhwindja or neighbouring collectivities. While most ASM workers 
reported little left over from their wages once subsistence needs had been met, some had 
made modest investments in land, livestock and housing locally. Shaft managers were all 
from Luhwindja, and most reported more sizeable local investments, while many also 
reported using their profits to buy land in and move their families to Bukavu.   
As with workers at Kadumwa, the overwhelming majority of hired labour, 
subcontractor workers and unskilled Twangiza Mining workers were from local herder–
farmer families, and consumed or invested most of their wages locally. Among Twangiza 
Mining’s skilled workers, there was a greater representation of people from urban families 
whose parents were wage earners (in mines or plantations), state agents, teachers, clerks and 
traders. This group of workers tended to expend their wages outside of Luhwindja, primarily 
in Bukavu, where many of them were from. In addition, most skilled Twangiza Mining 
workers were lodged and fed on–site, meaning they rarely set foot outside of the mine during 
their time in Luhwindja. Thus, while some of the consumption and investment patterns of 
skilled Twangiza Mining workers were oriented locally, they were generally directed away 
from Luhwindja and towards Bukavu. 
This non–local orientation of wage expenditure was even more pronounced among 
Twangiza’s managerial group, which to recall from Table 2, captured 51 per cent of the total 
wages accruing to labour at the mine in 2017. Once on–site, and as with skilled workers, 
Twangiza Mining’s managerial group ate and drank at company restaurants and bars and 
rarely left the compound. As one manager said, ‘I’m not familiar with the locals. I come for 
one month then after one month I fly back’ (Interview, African Assay Laboratories manager, 
Twangiza, 6 June 2017). On the whole, managerial consumption and investment took place 
outside of Luhwindja, and for foreign managers (who captured $5.6 million of the $8.4 
million accruing to this managerial stratum, or 67 per cent), almost exclusively outside of the 
DRC. As a Kenyan subcontractor manager explained, ‘when we stay on site, we spend very 
little…. I’m investing back home’ (Interview, Aggreko manager, Twangiza, 6 June 2017). 
Some Congolese managers also had externally–oriented investment patterns, as their families 
were based overseas, predominantly in South Africa but also in the US, Canada and Europe.  
Drawing on this analysis, and by extrapolating backwards from the wage data 
presented in the previous section, it’s possible to make an approximate comparison between 
the mining wages and profits earned, consumed and invested locally prior to and seven years 
after the construction of the Twangiza mine. From this comparison, it can be seen, first, that 
the total number of people employed in mining locally has decreased from around 6,000 to 
3,000 across this time frame. Second, the total annual income accruing to groups of mining 
labour who consume and invest their income locally has also decreased, from around $16 
million to $10 million (Table 3).    
Table 3. Mining income before and after Banro’s arrival, Luhwindja 
Time 
Period 











Artisanal Site Workers 1,496 846,772 Local 
Artisanal Shaft Workers 4,157 8,132,031 Local 
Artisanal Shaft Managers 346 6,957,890 Local/Non–Local 
TOTAL PRE–BANRO 6,000 15,936,693 – 
2017 Artisanal Site Workers 499 297,717 Local 
Artisanal Shaft Workers 1,386 2,710,677 Local 
Artisanal Shaft Managers 115 2,319,897 Local/Non–Local 
Industrial Workers (Unskilled)* 846 2,168,108 Local 
Industrial Workers (Skilled) 303 2,579,806 Local/Non–Local 
TOTAL POST–BANRO 3,149 10,075,604 – 
Notes: * Unskilled denotes hired labour, subcontractor workers and unskilled Twangiza Mining workers; To determine the 
units of workers and managers across each category in artisanal mining, the same weighting was used as observed between 
the three categories at Kadumwa; To determine the total annual wages of site workers, the wages earned by water carriers, 
ore carriers and ore washers were likewise weighted as observed at Kadumwa. 
Source: Author data presented above.    
 
The scale and directionality of these findings are supported by the many testimonies 
from local farmers, herders, teachers, hospital workers, priests, civil servants and youth, who 
in conversation consistently foregrounded the relative strength of the local Luhwindjan 
economy prior to Banro’s arrival. The following statement from a young churchgoer is 
illustrative:  
I think that artisanal mining is very important for us. All of us grew up in this system and 
made progress in this way. Our parents had a market thanks to the work of artisanal 
miners. When a miner comes from work, he buys something, and this something allows 
me to study. Since Banro has arrived, you see parents saying “I don’t have money to pay 
school fees” and children staying at home…We hadn’t experienced that before 
(Interview, Luhwindja Parish youth member, Luhwindja, 27 November 2016). 
Thus, rather than strengthening the economy through the provision of additional and well–
remunerated labour, the process of TNC–led mining (re)industrialisation in South Kivu has, 
on the contrary, led to a generalised deterioration in local conditions. 
Conclusion 
Lewis’ theorisation on the relationship between productivity and wages in the context of 
peripheral development provides a useful lens to interpret the findings. To recall, Lewis’ 
model contends that in an open economy with unlimited supplies of labour, formal sector 
wages will be set in the ‘subsistence sectors’ of the informal economy and will tend to 
stagnate, unless the productivity of those operating in the informal economy (or the overall 
level of employment) is simultaneously increased. This appears to hold in the case of 
Luhwindja in South Kivu, where in a context of labour abundance and in a continuation of 
historical trends from at least as early as the 1980s, industrial worker wages at Banro’s 
Twangiza mine have been set more in the informal ASM economy, than in relation to labour 
productivity in LSM. In 2017, despite the industrial Twangiza mine inducing a 25–fold 
increase in productivity compared to the nearby artisanal mine of Kadumwa, 72 per cent of 
workers at Twangiza earned broadly equivalent wages to those earned at Kadumwa, and 
industrial wages have been stagnant since at least 2012. 
These findings corroborate the insights generated by critical GVC scholarship, in 
particular that the expansion of labour informality and subcontracting has facilitated low 
worker wages, while only formal workers seem to benefit from GVC inclusion (Meagher, 
2016). Forty per cent of workers at Twangiza were informal, all working for hired labour or 
subcontractor firms at the lowest levels of the mine’s labour hierarchy. The only industrial 
worker group earning significantly higher wagers than artisanal workers was the skilled 
workers formally contracted to Banro’s Congolese subsidiary, Twangiza Mining. The 
findings also further this literature, which tends to focus on worker–level dynamics, by 
providing a distributional wage analysis thatpoints to the severity of the income inequality 
generated across GVC labour hierarchies. In the case of Banro, a managerial class 
representing 16 per cent of Twangiza’s labour was the main beneficiary of the increased 
wage inequality induced by Banro’s arrival, capturing 51 percent of total wages (with the 
foreign stratum of this class, representing just five percent of labour, capturing 35 per cent).   
Meanwhile, due to the forced displacement of artisanal miners and the low level of 
industrial employment, seven years after the construction of Banro’s Twangiza mine, the 
overall amount of mining labour available in Luhwindja had nearly halved. Combined with 
low wages to most industrial workers and the uneven distribution of these wages, this led to 
an estimated decrease of around 40 per cent in the total amount of mining wages consumed 
and invested locally, from around $16 million before 2010 to $10 million in 2017. This has, 
in turn, had damaging effects on the strength and vibrancy of the local economy. Based on 
the data presented, the wisdom of the continued LSM policy ‘bias’ in Africa (Hilson, 2019) is 
questioned, particularly if taken in conjunction with existing literature on the enclave–like 
nature of LSM in African LIC settings (Bush, 2008). Further research is needed, nonetheless, 
both on gold and other industrially mined minerals across African LICs, to test the 
generalisability of the findings.    
Turning more generally to the relationship between productivity and wages, a 
consideration of the findings suggests that prioritising African LIC integration into high 
productivity export sectors (whether mineral or otherwise) – the preferred approach of 
African mining industrialisation enthusiasts (Radley 2019a) and mainstream GVC proponents 
(Meagher, 2019) – will not necessarily equate to improved wages. Rather, as per the insight 
of Lewis, a central component of any strategy to achieve these outcomes must be to prioritise 
investment to increase the productivity of informal ‘subsistence sectors’, most notably 
smallholder agricultural producers, a group long marginalised and neglected by many African 
governments, including in the DRC. The case study evidence presented in this article 
suggests that failure to address Lewis’ structural wage constraint will result in the 
continuation of low and stagnant wages to the majority of export sector workers in the 
African periphery, irrespective of productivity growth in these sectors.    
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Appendix 



















1 932 3,460 4,392 9 488 
2 1,355 1,511 2,866 9 318 
3 419 236 655 9 73 
4 1,051 0 1,051 12 88 
5 934 0 934 14 67 
6 575 0 575 12 48 
7 1,061 808 1,868 10 187 
8 1,083 0 1,083 8 135 
9 1,714 510 2,224 12 185 
10 1,834 560 2,394 12 200 
11 938 0 938 12 78 
12 1,267 543 1,809 12 151 
13 0 834 834 8 104 
AVERAGE MONTHLY WAGES 163 
AVERAGE ANNUAL WAGES 1,956 
 


















Taxes (d) Profits  
(a – b – c – 
d) 
Govt. Army Police CCALU 
1 6,379 4,566 128 14 11 4 11 1,645 
2 3,620 2,994 73 14 11 4 11 514 
3 861 740 0 14 11 4 11 82 
4 4,079 1,194 0 14 11 4 11 2,845 
5 2,619 1,009 0 14 11 4 11 1,570 
6 1,567 687 0 14 11 4 11 840 
7 3,829 2,023 192 14 11 4 11 1,575 
8 3,904 1,231 195 14 11 4 11 2,438 
9 2,943 2,368 147 14 11 4 11 388 
10 4,660 2,488 233 14 11 4 11 1,899 
11 2,013 1,029 101 14 11 4 11 844 
12 4,057 1,906 203 14 11 4 11 1,908 
AVERAGE MONTHLY PROFITS 1,379 
AVERAGE ANNUAL PROFITS 16,549 
 
Notes: ‘Wages to Workers’ were taken from a combination of the shaft worker wage data presented in Table A and the wages 
paid by shaft managers to water carriers and ore carriers, as recorded in the monthly logbooks; One logbook has been excluded 
as bag production was not adequately recorded. 
Source: Calculations based on author data.  
 
1 Author calculations based on data from the World Bank Country Database. 
2 Net rather than gross figures are presented throughout, considering both formal and informal taxes. 
3 Supporting union delegate interview data, in a 2017 employee contract template provided to the 
author by Twangiza Mining’s Senior Human Resources Officer, there was no reference to wage 
increases. 
 
